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ABSTRACT

How does the market react to a government shutdown? Can investors earn above normal
returns by acting on this type of information? How efficient is the market in reacting to the
announcement of this type of event? This event study tests market efficiency theory by analyzing
the impact of two recent US Government shutdowns on the risk adjusted stock price returns of a
sample of 50 firms. This study used the standard risk adjusted event study methodology found in
the finance literature. Evidence confirms the significant and consistent negative reaction of the
risk adjusted returns for the two 50 firm samples of government contracting firms up to 30 days
before and after the announcements of the 1995 and 2013 government shutdown. Evidence here
documents the tremendous loss of market capital in reaction to a failure of the Federal
Government policy makers to compromise and produce a timely operating budget.
INTRODUCTION

A government in gridlock that fails to compromise on a budget agreement results in a
government shutdown which may cause significant damage to the nation’s economy. If
Washington policy makers cause a shutdown, the consequences of the failure of the decision
making process offer important implications for future decision makers. The enormous costs
associated with gridlock ought to be measured and weighed in the decision making process. One
way to quantify the economy’s reaction to a massive government shutdown is to examine how
the stock market reacts to a government shutdown.

Tests for market efficiency can show the effect of a government shutdown on the stock
market. There are three types of market efficiency: weak-form efficiency, semi-strong-form
efficiency and strong-form efficiency. These various levels of efficiency have different
implications for the market’s reaction to an event such as a Federal Government shutdown.
According to weak-form efficiency, future prices cannot be predicted by analyzing prices from
the past. Excess returns cannot be earned by using investment strategies based on historical share
prices or other historical data. Semi-strong-form efficiency is characterized by share prices
adjusting quickly to publicly available information. The market will respond quickly and will be
unbiased so that no excess returns can be earned by trading on information in the form of public
announcements such as a government shutdown. With strong-form efficiency, stock prices
reflect all information, public and private, and no one can earn excess returns by acting on inside
information.
The purpose of this event study was to test market efficiency theory by analyzing the
impact of the government shutdowns of 1995/1996 and 2013 on two samples of 50 firms each.
This research tests whether the information embedded in a government shutdown announcement
exhibits weak or semi-strong market efficiency. This study tests the effects of the government
shutdowns on the risk adjusted returns of 100 government contracting firms using the standard
risk adjusted event study methodology in the finance literature. It is reasonable to expect
government contracting firm to be highly sensitive to a potential federal government shutdown
since the revenues of these firms depends on a government that is open for business. If a strong
and swift correlation exists between the event date or the date of the government shutdown and
an immediate equity market price change, there may not be opportunity to earn an above normal
return and evidence would support efficient market theory.
LITERATURE REVIEW
According to the semi-strong efficient market hypothesis, stock price returns fully reflect
all available information. Stock prices react so fast to public information that no investor can
earn an above normal return by acting on any public announcements, such as the US government
shutdown; one in 1995 and one in 2013.
The US government entered a shutdown October 1, 2013 through October 16, 2013, the
second longest since 1980 and the most significant measured in terms of employee furlough days
(Impacts and Costs, 2013). This shutdown most operations of the government after Congress
failed to reach an agreement on the U.S. Federal budget for the fiscal year of 2014 and President
Obama’s healthcare bill; this was the first government shutdown in 17 years. During the
shutdown, approximately 800,000 federal employees were furloughed (Hankel, 2013), for a
combined total of 6.6 million days (Impacts and Costs, 2013). What happened to the companies
that relied on government contracts? Did this affect their normal course of business? Was there
an impact to their stock prices? There was a previous federal government shutdown in 19951996.
The budget wars in 1995 resulted in the government shutting down for six days,
November 14-19, and again from December 15, 1995-January 6, 1996 (Kosar, 2004). A dispute
between President Bill Clinton and Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich caused the shutdown.
They could not agree on domestic spending cuts in the fiscal year 1996 (Drew, 1996). Did both
of these shutdowns in 1995/96 and 2013 have a similar impact on the stock market? How fast
did the market react to both shutdowns? Is the market efficient with respect to a government
shutdown? Answers to these questions offer significant implications for policy makers in
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Washington as they weigh the economic costs associated with gridlock and failure to
compromise on a budget deal to keep the government open.
Government shutdowns can cost the Federal government billions of dollars. The payroll
cost of furloughed employee salaries for the 2013 shutdown was $2.0 billion. The Federal
government also incurs other costs as a result of a shutdown: fees go uncollected, IRS
enforcement and other program integrity measures are halted and the Federal government has to
pay additional interest on payments that are late because of a shutdown (Burwell, 2013). A
government shutdown has negative effects on the economy. Import and export applications are
put on hold which can negatively impact trade (Burwell, 2013). Travel and tourism is disrupted
at national parks and monuments which hurts local economies (Burwell, 2013).
Not only do government shutdowns impact the financial well-being of the country, they
also have a negative impact on American citizens. There are Americans who rely on critical
government programs and services (Kosar, 2004). Patients are unable to enroll in clinical trials at
the National Institutes of Health, which can make a difference in a patient’s life. Tax refunds are
delayed and some Americans rely on this money to make yearly payments (Burwell, 2013).
Finally, government shutdowns can have a long-term impact on the government’s ability to
retain a skilled workforce. The 2013 shutdown followed a three-year pay freeze for Federal
employees and cuts in training (Burwell, 2013).
Fama (1970, 1976) defined market efficiency in three forms: weak-form, semi-strongform and strong-form. Weak-form efficiency deals with the notion that no investor can earn an
above normal economic return by developing trading rules based on past price or return
information. If the market is weak form efficient, then stock price reacts so fast to all past
information that no investor can earn an above normal return (i.e. higher than the risk adjusted
stock price return) by acting on this type of information. Investors cannot use technical analysis
of pricing patterns to predict the value of stock prices. The weak from market efficiency test is
designed to show that successive price returns are random and independent (Kharusi, Sami, &
Weagley, 2014). For example, if an investor reviews a public quarterly report and buys the firm’s
stock after discovering the firm had higher than expected earnings for the quarter but the stock
price does not rise, the market is said to be efficient with respect to past information and is weak
form efficient.
According to the semi-strong form efficient market hypothesis concept, the prices of the
stocks fully reflect all available information and it’s not possible to earn an above normal risk
adjusted return by acting on this type of information (Ross, 2013). Fama was one of the major
supporters of the efficient market hypothesis. Semi-strong-form market efficiency states that no
investor can earn an above normal, economic return based on any publicly available information
such as accounting statements, stock split announcements, dividend announcements, sale of
stock announcements, repurchase of stock announcements, block trades, and earnings
announcements (Semi-Strong Form, 2014). A federal government shutdown announcement
would also represent this type of publicly available information relative to market efficiency. If
the market is semi-strong form efficient, then stock price reacts so fast to all public information
that no investor can earn an above normal return by acting on this type of information. The
investors cannot use technical analysis or fundamental analysis to find the value of stocks
(Kharusi, Sami, & Weagley, 2014). Public announcements of a government shutdown, stock
splits, repurchases, and dividend increases are examples of public information. If an investor
trades the stock on the announcement date and still does not make an above normal return, the

3

market is semi-strong form efficient. This study examines semi-strong efficiency with respect to
the announcement of a federal government shutdown.
Strong-form efficiency theory suggests that no investor can earn an above normal,
economic return using any information, public or private. If the market is strong form efficient,
then stock prices react so fast to all information (public and private) that no investor can earn an
above normal return by acting on this type of information. In this case, the market reacts to an
event within the confines of the firm when it occurs even before it is publicly announced. For
this to occur, investors must act on insider information, which is illegal. If an investor trades the
stock on the event based on inside information, and still does not make an above normal return,
the market is strong form efficient.
Since information effects prices immediately, investors should only expect to obtain a
normal rate of return. However, does market efficiency hold for public announcements of a
government shutdown? Weak form efficiency states that a company’s stock price is based on
past prices and information, while strong form efficiency argues that the price is a reflection of
all information, public and private. While both of these theories have merit, this study asserts
that government shutdown announcements are reflected in the price of a company’s stock
according to the semi-strong form of efficiency, indicating that all public information available
determines the price of the stock.
METHODOLGY
This research study analyzed the risk adjusted rate of return for a sample of 50 firms
before and after the 2 government shutdowns in 1995/96 and 2013 to test the semi-strong form
efficient market hypothesis. Samples were randomly selected from government contracting
firms. 36 firms from the first shutdown remained in the second shutdown. This study used the
standard risk adjusted event study methodology found in the finance literature. The event day
(day 0) is the date of the government shutdown announcement, which is November 14 for 1995
and October 1 for 2013. The historical financial data was obtained through Yahoo Finance and
analyzed as follows.
1.
The historical stock prices of the sample companies and S&P 500, for the event study
duration of -180 to +30 days (where day -30 to +30 is the event period and day 0 is the event
day) were obtained.
2.
The holding period returns (R) for the sample firms and the corresponding S&P 500
index (Rm) for each day in this study were calculated using the following formula:
Current daily return = (current day close price – previous day close price)
Previous day close price
3.
A regression analysis was performed using the actual daily return of each company
(dependent variable) and the corresponding S&P 500 daily return (independent variable) over the
pre-event period (day -180 to -31) to obtain the intercept alpha and beta. The firms’ alphas and
betas are shown in Tables 1 and 2 for the 1995and 2013 shutdowns, respectively.
Risk-Adjusted Method (Market Model)
Ri,t = a + bRm,t + e parameter estimation during pre-event period
E(R) = a + bRm
for each day during event period
Excess Return = Actual Return – (a + bRm)
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Table 1: ALPHAS AND BETAS FOR 1995 GOVERNMENT SHUTDOWN
Firm Name
Ticker
Alpha
Beta
Lockheed Martin
Northrop Grumman
Verizon
Raytheon
Hewlett-Packard
Computer Sciences Corporation
Jacobs Engineering Group
Boeing
General Dynamics Corporation
Harris Corporation
CACI International
IBM
United Technologies
B/E Aerospace Inc.
Celadon Group
Honeywell International
AT&T
Alliant Techsystems
Unisys Corp
General Electric
Century Link
RTI International
Xerox Corporation
Ball Corporation
Cubic Corporation
Oshkosh Corporation
McKesson Corporation
URS Corporation
Humana Inc.
Healthnet Inc.
Textron
Navistar International
Merck & Co. Inc
Pfizer Inc.
Cardinal Health
Tetratech
Exxon Mobil Corporation
Valero Energy Corporation
Ciber
GlaxoSmithKline plc
AstraZeneca plc
Methode Electronics
Dominion Resources
Praxair
Pepco Holdings
GenCorp
Johnson & Johnson
Koninklijke Philips
Medtronic Inc.
Boston Scientific Corp

LMT
NOC
VZ
RTN
HPQ
CSC
JEC
BA
GD
HRS
CACI
IBM
UTX
BEAV
CGI
HON
T
ATK
UIS
GE
CTL
RTI
XRX
BLL
CUB
OSK
MCK
URS
HUM
HNT
TXT
NAV
MRK
PFE
CAH
TTEK
XOM
VLO
CBR
GSK
AZN
MEI
D
PX
POM
GY
JNJ
PHG
MDT
BSX

0.00089706
0.00138441
-0.00014
0.000723
0.000587
0.000406
0.000448
0.000777
9.58E-05
0.000411
0.000998
0.0004
0.000956
0.00319
-0.00122
-0.00023
0.000672
0.001084
-0.00195
-0.00026
-0.00037
0.005413
-0.00031
-0.00138
0.000479
0.00116
0.000797
-4.4E-05
-0.00214
0.000492
0.000587
-0.00236
0.001617
0.001745
0.000765
0.002904
0.000322
0.001639
0.000955
0.000969
0.001904
0.001438
-0.00029
-0.00011
0.001253
-0.00152
0.000929
0.001664
0.002613
0.002397

1.16907402
0.71002098
1.100214
0.542108
1.685688
1.265531
0.667897
1.378171
0.868757
0.892525
1.279062
1.122684
0.732155
0.139499
0.147218
0.962829
1.176627
0.311155
0.860372
1.243325
0.332293
0.254906
1.347202
0.806172
0.832415
0.646395
0.647378
0.683847
1.205183
1.144353
0.807666
1.09509
0.583926
0.317451
0.133139
-0.02411
0.568414
0.364462
1.925333
0.480373
0.318683
1.320291
0.531802
0.988635
0.602678
0.190938
0.820479
0.779294
1.04057
1.758926
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Table 2: ALPHAS AND BETAS FOR 2013 GOVERNMENT SHUTDOWN
Firm Name

Ticker

Alpha

Beta

Lockheed Martin
Northrop Grumman
Verizon
Raytheon
Hewlett-Packard
Computer Science Group
Jacobs Engineering Group
Boeing
General Dynamics Corporation
Harris Corporation
CACI International
IBM
United Technologies
B/E Aerospace Inc.
Celadon Group
Honeywell International
AT&T
Alliant Techsystems
Unisys Corp
General Electric
Century Link
RTI International
Xerox Corporation
Ball Corporation
Cubic Corporation
Oshkosh Corporation
McKesson Corporation
URS Corporation
Humana Inc.
Healthnet Inc.
Textron
Navistar International
Merck & Co. Inc
Pfizer Inc.
Cardinal Health
Tetratech
Booz Allen Hamilton
KBR Inc.
Fluor Corp.
L3 Communications Holding
ITT Corporation
Rockwell Collins
AmerisourceBergen Corp
Babcock & Wilcox Company
CGI Group
Accenture plc
VSE Corp
United Parcel Service
AECOM Technology Corp
Southcross Energy Partners

LMT
NOC
VZ
RTN
HPQ
CSC
JEC
BA
GD
HRS
CACI
IBM
UTX
BEAV
CGI
HON
T
ATK
UIS
GE
CTL
RTI
XRX
BLL
CUB
OSK
MCK
URS
HUM
HNT
TXT
NAV
MRK
PFE
CAH
TTEK
BAH
KBR
FLR
LLL
IT
COL
ABC
BWC
GIB
ACN
VSEC
UPS
ACM
SXE

0.00132418
0.00175598
0.00043
0.001474
0.002632
0.000498
0.001012
0.001463
0.000627
0.000402
0.000583
-0.00073
0.000557
0.00125
-0.00145
0.000577
-0.00039
0.002233
0.001625
0.000244
-0.00152
-0.00041
0.001263
-0.00062
-8.2E-05
0.001109
0.00069
0.000659
0.001691
-1.2E-07
-0.00103
0.000877
0.000268
1.88E-05
0.000623
-0.00222
0.002182
-0.00052
-0.00078
0.000631
0.001006
0.000664
0.001326
0.000421
-0.00145
-0.00051
0.003737
0.000142
-6.7E-06
-0.00114

0.79831544
0.79325727
0.641845
0.71652
0.878972
1.361739
1.460351
0.916067
0.880267
0.996649
0.973898
0.762279
1.023362
1.26577
1.382945
1.172603
0.71175
0.856703
1.31539
0.943636
0.778948
1.490997
1.352813
0.908086
0.947262
1.921241
0.785438
1.083178
0.345725
1.026708
1.848564
2.508768
0.701658
0.80349
0.848268
1.163991
0.775281
1.453227
1.694448
0.807102
1.471509
0.98289
0.613073
0.932074
1.382945
1.096228
0.736176
0.770687
1.748248
0.221362
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4.
In order to get the normal expected returns, the risk-adjusted method was used. The
expected return for each stock, for each day of the event period from day -30 to +30 was
calculated as follows:
E(R) = alpha + beta * (Rm)
5.
Excess return (ER) was calculated as follows:
ER = the Actual Return (R) – Expected Return E(R)
6.
Average Excess Returns (AER) were calculated (for each day from -30 to +30) by
averaging the excess returns for all the firms for each day.
AER = Sum of Excess Return for sample firms on each day
N
7.
Cumulative AER (CAER) was calculated by adding the AERs for each day from -30 to
+30.
8.
Graphs of AER and Cumulative AER were plotted for the event period.
To test for semi-strong market efficiency on the government shutdown announcements,
the following null and alternative hypotheses were used for the two shutdown samples:
H10: The risk adjusted return of the stock price of the sample of 50 government
contracting firms is not significantly affected by this type of information on the announcement
date of the November 14, 1995 government shutdown.
H11: The risk adjusted return of the stock price of the sample of 50 government
contracting firms is significantly negatively affected by this type of information on the
announcement date of the November 14, 1995 government shutdown.
H20: The risk adjusted return of the stock price of the sample of 50 government
contracting firms is not significantly affected by this type of information around the
announcement date of the November 14, 1995 government shutdown as defined by the event
period.
H21: The risk adjusted return of the stock price of the sample of 50 government
contracting firms is significantly negatively affected around the announcement date of the
November 14, 1995 government shutdown as defined by the event period.
H30: The risk adjusted return of the stock price of the sample of 50 government
contracting firms is not significantly affected by this type of information on the announcement
date of the October 1, 2013 government shutdown.
H31: The risk adjusted return of the stock price of the sample of 50 government
contracting firms is significantly negatively affected by this type of information on the
announcement date of the October 1, 2013 government shutdown.
H40: The risk adjusted return of the stock price of the sample of 50 government
contracting firms is not significantly affected by this type of information around the
announcement date of the October 1, 2013 government shutdown as defined by the event period.
H41: The risk adjusted return of the stock price of the sample of 50 government
contracting firms is significantly negatively affected around the announcement date of the
October 1, 2013 government shutdown as defined by the event period.
H50: The reaction of risk adjusted return of the stock price of the sample of 50
government contracting firms for the 1995/96 government shutdown is not significantly different
from the reaction of risk adjusted return of the stock price of the sample of 50 government
contracting firms for the 2013 government shutdown around the announcement date as defined
by the event period.
7

H51: The reaction of risk adjusted return of the stock price of the sample of 50
government contracting firms for the 1995/96 government shutdown is significantly different
from the reaction of risk adjusted return of the stock price of the sample of 50 government
contracting firms for the 2013 government shutdown around the announcement date as defined
by the event period.
QUANTITATIVE TESTS AND RESULTS
Did the market react to the government shutdown announcements in 1995 and 2013?
Was the information surrounding the event significant? A’priori, one would expect there to be a
significant difference in the Actual Average Daily Returns (Day -30 to Day +30) and the
Expected Average Daily Returns (Day -30 to Day +30) if the information surrounding the event
impounds new, significant information on the market price of the sample firms' stock. If a
significant risk adjusted difference is observed, then we support our hypothesis that this type of
information did in fact significantly either increase or decrease stock price. To statistically test
for a difference in the Actual Daily Average Returns and the Expected Daily Average Returns
over the event period day -30 to day +30, we conducted a paired sample t-test for the two
samples and found a significant difference at the 5% level between actual average daily returns
and the risk adjusted expected average daily returns. Average Excess Return (AER) graphs are
shown on pages 9 and 10. Results here support the alternate hypothesis H21 and H41: The risk
adjusted return of the stock price of the two samples (50 firms each) of government contracting
firms is significantly negatively affected around the 1995 and 2013 government shutdown dates
as defined by the event periods. This finding supports the significance of the information around
the event since the market’s negative reaction was observed.
Is it possible to isolate and observe the samples’ daily response to the announcement
from day -30 to day +30? If so, at what level of efficiency did the market respond to the
information and what are the implications for market efficiency? Another purpose of this
analysis was to test the efficiency of the market in reacting to the government shutdown
announcements. Specifically, do we observe weak, semi-strong, or strong form market
efficiency as defined by Fama, 1970, in the efficient market hypothesis? The key in the analysis
is to determine if the AER and CAER are significantly different from zero or that there is a
visible graphical or statistical relationship between time and either AER or CAER. T-tests of
AER and CAER both tested different from zero at the 5% level of significance. Likewise,
observation of the CAER Graphs in Charts 2 and 4 (graphs of CAER from day –30 to day +30
for the 1995 and 2013 government shutdown samples, respectively) on pages 10 and 11 confirms
the significant and consistent negative reaction of the risk adjusted returns for the two samples of
government contracting firms up to 30 prior to the announcements of the 1995 and 2013
government shutdowns. Graphs in Charts 2 and 4 demonstrate that the announcements of the
1995 and 2013 government shutdown had a significant negative impact on the firms’ share price
up to 30 days prior to announcement day 0 with a continuous negative trend up to 30 following
day 0. The evidence supports the null hypotheses H10 and H30: The risk adjusted return of the
stock price of the 2 samples of 50 government contracting firms is not significantly affected by
this type of information on the announcement dates of the November 14, 1995 and the October 1,
2013 government shutdowns. The risk adjusted return of the stock price of the two samples of
government contracting firms is not significantly affected by this type of information on the
announcement date when made public.
8

For the samples of firms analyzed, an investor is unable to earn an above normal risk
adjusted return by acting on the public announcements of the government shutdowns. As of the
announcement date, the firms’ stock prices had already adjusted to the new information
embedded in the government shutdown. However, after the announcement, stock price exhibited
a continuous negative trend up to 30 days post announcement suggesting that an investor could
earn an above normal return following the government shutdown announcement. Such post
announcement stock returns behavior offers support for the weak form of market efficiency.
Overall, the results are consistent with the semi-strong form market efficiency hypothesis which
states that the stock price reflects all publicly available information on the announcement but the
post announcement negative trend of the risk adjusted stock returns is consistent with weak form
market efficiency hypothesis. Interestingly, the results for both samples suggest significant
trading activity up to 30 days prior to the announcement of the government shutdowns, possibly
suggesting that investors may have anticipated the events.
In addition, the study analyzed whether or not market efficiency varies by timing of the
government shutdowns. Specifically, are the observed reactions to the 1995 and 2013 shutdowns
similar? Observation and comparison of the CAER graphs in Chart 2 and 4 below show similar
reaction to the 1995 and 2013 government shutdown announcements. Specifically CAER graphs
in Chart 2 and 4 below show a continuous negative trend in risk adjusted stock returns from day 30 to day +30. The negative reaction to the 1995 shutdown appears to be slightly larger and
more volatile than in 2013. While there are minor observable differences in the two samples’
reaction to the shutdown news, overall the results support H50. The reaction of risk adjusted
return of the stock price of the sample of 50 government contracting firms for the 1995/96
government shutdown is not significantly different from the reaction of risk adjusted return of
the stock price of the sample of 50 government contracting firms for the 2013 government
shutdown around the announcement date as defined by the event period. Evidence here
documents the tremendous loss of market capital in reaction to a failure of the Federal
Government policy makers to compromise and produce a timely operating budget.
Chart 1: AER vs. Time 1995 Government Shutdown
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Chart 2: CAER vs. Time 1995 Government Shutdown
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Chart 3: AER vs. Time 2013 Government Shutdown
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Chart 4: CAER vs. Time 2013 Government Shutdown
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CONCLUSION
The purpose of this event study was to test market efficiency theory by analyzing the
impact of the government shutdowns of 1995/1996 and 2013 on two samples of 50 firms each.
This research tests whether the information embedded in government shutdown announcement
exhibits semi-strong market efficiency. The risk adjusted return of the stock price of the two
samples (50 firms each) of government contracting firms is significantly negatively affected
around the 1995 and 2013 government shutdown dates as defined by the event periods. This
finding supports the significance of the information around the event since the market’s negative
reaction was observed.
Evidence confirms the significant and consistent negative reaction of the risk adjusted
returns for the two samples of government contracting firms up to 30 prior to the announcements
of the 1995 and 2013 government shutdown. Results demonstrate that the announcements of the
1995 and 2013 government shutdown had a significant negative impact on the firm’s share price
up to 30 days prior to announcement day 0 with a continuous negative trend up to 30 following
day 0. The risk adjusted return of the stock price of the government contracting firms is not
significantly affected by this type of information on the announcement dates. However, after
the announcement, stock price exhibited a continuous negative trend up to 30 days post
announcement suggesting that an investor could earn an above normal return following the
government shutdown announcement. Such post announcement stock returns behavior offers
support for the weak form of market efficiency. Results are mixed with support of the semistrong form market efficiency hypothesis stating that stock price reflects all publicly available
information on the announcement but the post announcement negative trend of the risk adjusted
stock returns is consistent with weak form market efficiency hypothesis. Interestingly, the
results for both samples suggest significant trading activity up to 30 days prior to the
announcement of the government shutdowns possibly suggesting that investors may have
anticipated the events.
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In comparing the 1995 and 2013 reactions, there are minor observable differences in the
two samples’ reaction to the shutdown news. Evidence here documents the tremendous loss of
market capital in reaction to a failure of the Federal Government policy makers to compromise
and produce a timely operating budget. An important extension of the current study could
conduct the same tests on the announcement of the government’s reopening to investigate the
possible gain in the capital markets relative to the positive news.
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